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and their Potential Scope
by Gregory A. Thomas
An ongoing debate in the San Francisco Bay /
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta water quality standards set-
ting process has been the degree to which the Clean Water
Act' allows California (or. in default of state action, the
Federal Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA])
to regulate stream flows into and through the estuary to pro-
tect aquatic blota. The State Water Resources Control Board
[hereinafter SWRCBI. in its seven-year long effort to set
water quality standards for the estuary, has stumbled over
the effect that implementation of these standards would
have on existing water rights. Its failure to finalize standards
has compelled the EPA to step in and promulgate federal
replacement water quality standards, which are to be final-
ized pursuant to court order by December 15, 1994. lust in
time to illuminate some of the pivotal issues still outstand-
ing in this matter, the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in PUD No. I of Jefferson County and City of Tacoma v.
Washington Dep't of Ecology2 sanctions the view that the CWA
gives the states (and possibly the EPA) a great deal of lati-
tude in implementing water quality standards to protect
important environmental resources, even if this results in
limitations on the use of water rights.
This Article examines the ramifications and potential
scope of the PUD No. I decision. It begins by briefly summa-
rizing the factual background and holdings of PUD No. 1. Next,
it outlines the potential effect of the decision's holdings in
several areas. With respect to hydropower licensing, PUD No.
I alters the balance of state and federal prerogatives in
resolving the conflict between instream values and power
generation. The decision also suggests that states can protect
use designations under the CWA directly and independently
of water quality criteria; it eliminates the artificial distinction
between regulation of water quality and regulation of water
quantity as this relates to protection of designated uses.
Finally, the decision affirms that water quality regulation may
incidentally restrict water use, notwithstanding state primacy
over water allocations. This Article concludes by examining
the impact of the holdings of PUD No. 1 on the restoration of
aquatic resources in the Bay-Delta region.
I. Summary of Facts and Holding
The issue in PUD No. I was whether the State of
Washington could condition a license for a hydroelectric
project on the maintenance of minimum stream flows to
protect salmon and steelhead runs. This project was pro-
posed to be located on the Dosewallips River, classified as
an 'extraordinary" water by the State of Washington.3
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1. 33 U.SoC. § 1251 (1994) [hereinafter CIAI.
2. 114 S. Ct. 1900 (1994) [hereinafter PUD No. I].
3. Id. at 1906.
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Among the water quality uses of this river desig-
nated by the state pursuant to the CWA was
salmonid migration, rearing, spawning, and har-
vesting. The Dosewallips River supports two
species of salmon (Coho and Chinook) and steel-
head trout. In addition to water quality standards,
the state had also adopted a statewide antidegra-
dation policy pursuant to the CWA.
4
The project would have diverted water from a
1.2-mile reach of the river through penstocks and a
power plant before releasing the water back into the
river, reducing the minimum streamflow from 149-
738 cubic feet per second Ihereinafter cfsl to 65-155
cfs.5 Because the proposed hydroelectric project
would result in "discharges" of dredge and fill mate-
rial and of flows from the tailrace into the
Dosewallips River, the project proponents (the peti-
tioners in the Supreme Court case) were required to
obtain state certification of the project pursuant to
section 401 of the CWA.6 As part of the 401 certifi-
cation process, the State imposed a minimum
stream flow condition on the project which required
maintenance of between 100 and 200 cfs, depend-
ing upon the season.
7
The principal issue on appeal to the Supreme
Court was whether this instream flow requirement
was a permissible condition in a 401 certification.
8
The Court answered this question in the affirmative,
reasoning that section 401(d) authorizes a state to
impose additional conditions and limitations on a
proposed project once the threshold requirement of
a discharge is satisfied. The Court's reasoning can
be broken down as follows.
First, the Court held that the "other limitations"
clause of section 401(d) authorizes conditions
designed to ensure compliance with the state's
water quality standards adopted pursuant to section
303 of the CWA The Court next considered whether
the minimum instream flow requirement qualified
as a condition or limitation designed to ensure com-
pliance with the state's water quality standards.
Answering this question in the affirmative, the Court
relied primarily on the state's determination that
the construction and operation of the project as
planned would be inconsistent with the designated
salmonid migration, rearing, spawning, and harvest-
ing. The Court noted that this designated use direct-
ly furthered the CWA's goals and policies.' 0
The Court rejected the petitioners' argument
that the instream flow requirement could not be
based on the designated use but only on the water
quality criteria adopted by the state under section
303 of the CWA" to achieve the designated uses. 12
Instead, the Court read section 303 and its imple-
menting EPA regulations as allowing a state to
require a project to be consistent with both desig-
nated uses and water quality criteria.13 To require
the states to enforce only the water quality criteria
component of their water quality standards, the
Court said, would "require [them] to study to a
level of great specificity each individual surface
water to ensure that the criteria applicable to that
water are sufficiently detailed and individualized to
fully protect the water's designated uses."14
The Court also held that the minimum instream
flow requirement was a permissible application of
state and federal antidegradation regulations,
which require existing instream water uses to be
maintained and protected. 15
Finally, the Court rejected petitioners' argu-
ment that the instream flow requirement was
impermissible because the CWA is concerned only
with "water quality," not "water quantity," noting
that such a distinction is "artificial." 16 In many
cases, "water quantity is closely related to water
quality; a sufficient lowering of water quantity in a
body of water could destroy all of its designated
uses...."17 Moreover, the Court stated, the CWA
4. Id. at 1905-07.
5. Id. at 1908.
6. That section provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to con-
duct any activity including, but not limited to, the con-
struction or operation of facilities which may result in
any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide
the licensing or permitting agency a certification from
the State...that any such discharge will comply with the
applicable provisions ofsections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316,
and 1317 of this title.
(d) Any certification provided for under this section
shall set forth any effluent limitations and other limita-
tions, and monitoring requirements necessary to assure
that any applicant for a Federal license or permit will
comply with any applicable effluent limitations and other
limitations under section 1311 or 1312 of this tile....and with
any other appropriate requirement of State law set forth in such
certification, and shall become a condition on any
Federal license or permit subject to the provisions of
this section.
33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (emphasis added).
7. 114 S. Ct. at 1907.08.
8. Id. at 1908.
9. Id. at 1908-09.
10. Id. at 1910.
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994).
12. 114 S. Ct. at 1910-12.
13. Id. at 1910.
14. Id. at 1912.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1912-13.
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itself embodies a broad concept of pollution, which
includes changes in the "movement, flow[,I or circu-
lation of any navigable waters."
18
The Court disposed of the assertion that its
holding would abrogate or conflict with sections
101(g) and 510(2) of the CWA, 19 which in essence
reserve to the states the right to allocate quantities
of water within their borders. It stated that these
provisions "preserve the authority of each State to
allocate water quantity as between users; they do not
limit the scope of water pollution controls that may
be imposed on users who have obtained, pursuant
to state law, a water allocation."20 According to the
Court, the section 401 instream flow requirement
did not violate the state's water rights authority
because it did not purport to determine petitioners'
proprietary right to water; rather, it merely deter-
mined "the nature of the use to which that propri-
etaly right may be put under the CWA...."21
II. Notable Features of the PUD No. I Decision
A. In Hydropower Licensing, PUD No. 1 Radically
Alters the Balance of State Versus Federal
Prerogatives in Resolving the Competition
Between Instream Values and Power Generation,
at Least in the Absence of Actual Conflict
Between States and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission.
In California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Conn'n,22
the so-called "Rock Creek" case, the Court unani-
mously held that the SWRCB was preempted under
the Federal Power Act, as read through the
Supremacy Clause, from mandating fishery releas-
es from a federally licensed dam, where that
requirement was more demanding than the terms
imposed by the federal license.23 The Court held, in
effect, that, where a regulatory judgment is made
18. Id. at 1913 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f) (1994)).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g). 1370 (1994).
20. 114 S. Ct. at 1913 (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. 495 U.S. 490. 506 (1989).
23. Id. at 506.
24. But. the Court suggested, state administration of pripd-
etani interests in water would not be disturbed by the federal licens-
ing authority. Id. at 501. This suggests that if the fishery had been
protected by conferring an environmental water right. It would not
have been preempted.
25. 985 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1993) (hereInafter Say!51.
26. Id. at 456. The court noted that the Federal Power Act Is
capable of different interpretations concerning the preemption
issue, especially section 821. which reads:
[nlothing contained in this chapter shall be construed
as affecting or intending to affect or In any way to Inter-
fere with the laws or the respective States relating to the
by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [here-
inafter FERC], an Inconsistent state regulatory
requirement is preempted.
24
If the "Rock Creek case" relegated the states to
the periphery in the process of balancing power
generation against downstream fishery protection.
the subsequent Ninth Circuit decision in Sayles
Hydro Ass'n v. Maughan 2s appeared to remove states
from the field entirely. Sayles resolved the question
of whether the "Rock Creek" case's preemption of
state regulation was limited to actual conflicts with
FERC determinations, or whether FERC's authority
over fishery releases from federally licensed dams
under the Federal Power Act was so complete as to
"occupy the field" and thereby preclude anyrole for
the state regulators. Interpreting the "Rock Creek'
rationale to imply total preemption, the Says Court
held that the SWRCB lacks the power to do anything
respecting fishery releases except determine propri-
etary water rights.26
PUD No. I resets the balance by giving the state
primacy over instream flow requirements pursuant
to its authority under the CWA to protect water
quality by issuing certifications to applicants for
federal licenses for activities which may result in
discharges to navigable waters.
In the PUD No. I case, the Court noted that the
hydro project would result in two types of "dis-
charges" that would trigger the certification require-
ment: the discharge of dredge and fill material and
the discharge of water from the tailrace back into
the Dosewallips River.27 Hydroelectric projects nec-
essarily involve release of either stored or diverted
water back into the water body. Leaving aside for a
moment the issue of whether dam releases can be
considered 'discharges, 28 the PUD No. 1 case
strongly suggests that off-stream power generation
projects will routinely invoke the certification
requirement. While the era of large-scale hydropow-
control, appropriation, use or distribution of water used
In Irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vest-
ed right acquired therein.
16 U SC § 821 (1994)- Yet the Court Interpreted section 821 as pro-
tecting from federal supersedure on!y those state laws g(r;eming pro-
prietary rights. Say s. 935 F 2d at 454-55. It rejected SWRCB's asser-
tion that Ca%!,nr= v FERC as applied to Its facts established only
'conflict preemption'supersedure pointing out thatonce cauanda v.
FERC made it dear that the state could control only proprietary
rights to rater, that established the category as "occupy the field"
preemption for eveqthing but proprietary rights to water. L4. at 456.
27 114S CL at 1903.
28 However. the implications of the PUD No. I opinion on
this Issue are broad. 'Dlscharges' back Into a river that has been
diverted through a generator and tailrace would seem to be indis-
tinguishable from 'discharges" of flows that ha-e been stored
behind an on-stream dam and released back into the river through
a generator This raises the question whether PUD No. I under-
mines the holding in NatfLr.l V iLif, Fedn v. GonttsLr. 693 F.2d 157
(DC Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Gomirl. that dam releases are not 'dis-
I'd1994
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er development is probably behind us, the state cer-
tification requirement applies to applications for
relicensing of existing dams. There will be hundreds
of these proceedings in the next decade. At present,
some 231 applications are pending before FERC.2 9
Thus, PUD No. 1 is bound to have wide application.
In PUD No. 1, the Supreme Court determined
that when a "discharge" triggers the state certifica-
tion requirement, section 401 empowers the state to
impose conditions to protect designated water qual-
ity uses.3 0 Importantly, it held that these conditions
are not confined to effluent limitations, but can also
include minimum stream flow prescriptions.
3'
Thus, as the dissent in PUD No. 1 bemoans,
under that case a state may use its water quality
certification authority to accomplish what SWRCB
was unable to do under its powers to administer
water rights under the holding in California v. FERC:
Because of section 401 (d)'s mandatory lan-
guage, federal courts have uniformly held
that FERC has no power to alter or review
section 401 conditions, and that the prop-
er forum for review of those conditions is
state court. Section 401(d) conditions
imposed by States are therefore binding on
FERC. Under the Court's interpretation,
then, it appears that the mistake of the
State in California v. FERC was not that it
had trespassed into territory exclusively
reserved to FERC; rather, it simply had not
hit upon the proper device-that is, the
section 401 certification-through which to
achieve its objectives.
32
How could a 7-2 decision in 1994 be so diamet-
rically different from a unanimous decision four
years earlier? Justice O'Connor distinguishes the
cases on the basis that the state certification in PUD
No. 1 was not incompatible with any licensing
charges' under the Clean water Act. That holding was based on rea-
soning that releases of water containing low dissolved oxygen, cold
temperatures, or excess sediment did not consitutethe addition of
pollutants to navigable waters, and therefore were not discharges
under the act. Id. at 17 1. O'Connor's opinion views the Clean Water
Act much more broadly, noting that 'water 'pollution' may result
from 'changes in the movement, flow, or circulation of any naviga-
ble waters.. .including changes caused by the construction of
dams." 1, 114 S. ct. at 1933 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f) (1994)). The
opinion further expressly recognizes that 'reduced stream flow, i.e.,
diminishment of water quantity, can constitute water pollution." Id.
It would appear then that the continued usability of the Gorsuch
holding is in doubt.
29. States Get Water Weapon, ENGINEERING NEws-REc., June 13.
1994, at 13.
30. 114 S. Ct. at 1909.
requirement imposed by FERC. 33 If a license Is
issued and if its terms conflict with the state mini-
mum stream flow prescriptions, the Issue of whether
section 401 of the CWA takes precedence over the
grant of exclusive licensing authority to FERC under
the Federal Power Act can be resolved later.
3 4
The stage is now being set for such a conflict in
FERC license order in the matter of Tunbridge
Mill.3' In this licensing order, FERC has reserved to
itself the decision as to whether stream flow and
fishery protection conditions issued by Vermont
were properly within the section 401 certification
authority, including whether the section 401 condi-
tions are sufficiently connected with the state's
water quality standards.3 6 FERC believes this Is a
federal question which it must in the first instance
answer. It abrogates this jurisdiction to itself on the
basis of the congressional decision reflected In the
Federal Power Act to give FERC the paramount role
in hydrolicensing.
FERC rejected the following state certification
conditions in this case:
1. Vermont sought to require that significant
changes in the project or its operations be submit-
ted to the state for review and approval. FERC
rejected this condition because, in its view, section
401 (a)(3) provides that the federal licensing agency
is to determine whether proposed license amend-
ments require new water quality certification.
2. The certification conditions prescribed cer-
tain bypass flows, the development of a monitoring
plan, the development of an erosion control plan,
and the construction of downstream fish passage
facilities. Vermont sought to condition commence-
ment of construction upon the state agreeing that
compliance with these conditions was proper.
FERC's view is that the state has no authority to halt
or order construction. After the state issues its cer-
tification, FERC believes that it alone is responsible
for imposing and policing the conditions.
31. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found the EPA's
policy that 'lalctivities, not merely discharges must comply with
state water quality standards" was entitled to deference,
32. Id. at 1920 (Thomas. I., dissenting). In the main, the dis-
sent is based on very mechanical construction rules (deference to
agency interpretations permissible only where statute Is ambigu-
ous, the ejusdem generis rule, the dictionary definition of'dlischarge),
whereas the majority opinion Is based on reasoning to effectuate
the overall purpose of the Clean Water Act: to protect beneficial
uses of water subject to human alteration-including physical
alteration.
33. Id. at 1914.
34. Id.
35. Tunbridge Mill Corp., Order Issuing License, 68 FERC.
61.078 (1994).
36. Id.
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3. The state included a reopener provision that
would allow it to alter the terms and conditions as
future circumstances suggest is necessary. FERC
was concerned that this provision would give the
state unilateral authority to alter its certificate.
In the case of another project in Michigan,
FERC rejected a liquidated damages provision for
violation of the terms of settlement because it
impinged on FERC's enforcement authority.
37
These licensing orders will present two issues
on appeal: does FERC have the authority to second
guess a state's decision as to whether particular
conditions are needed to protect designated water
quality uses and, the bigger issue, how to resolve
actual conflict regarding conditions properly within
scope of the certification. On the latter, the trade
press speculates that FERC will likely draw the line
at state conditions that are so onerous as to make
the hydropower facility uneconomical.
38
Two observations seem pertinent to the further
resolution of these issues. First, it is notable that a
1986 amendment to the Federal Power Act sets out
a process for resolving disputes between state (or
federal) resource agencies and FERC regarding pro-
posed licensing terms and conditions to protect
fisheries.39 The Electric Consumers Protection Act
at section (j)(2) reads:
Whenever the Commission believes that
any [fish and wildlife protection, mitiga-
tion, and/or enhancement] recommenda-
tion referred to in paragraph (1) may be
inconsistent with the purposes and
requirements of this subchapter or other
applicable law, the Commission and the
agencies referred to in paragraph (1) shall
attempt to resolve any such inconsistency,
giving due weight to the recommenda-
tions, expertise, and statutory responsibil-
ities of such agencies. If, after such
attempt, the Commission does not adopt
in whole or in part a recommendation of
37. FERC Hydra Orders Attempt to Grapple ,uih High Court RLfr4.
22 ENERY REP. 27. July 18. 1994-
38. id.
39. 16 U.S.C. 803(i)(2) (1994).
40. Id.
41.33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
42. 45 C.F.R. § 79.319 (1994).
43. 49 Fed. Reg. 49.234 (1982).
44. Section 303(c)(2) of the CWA provides that.
IWlater quality standardlsl shall consist of the desig-
nated uses of the navigable waters involved and the
water quality criteria for such waters based upon such
any such agency, the Commission shall
publish each of the following findings
(together with a statement of the basis for
each of the findings):
(A) A finding that adoption of such recom-
mendation is inconsistent with the purpos-
es of this Part or with other applicable pro-
visions of law.
(B) A finding that the conditions selected
by the Commission comply with the
requirements of paragraph (1).40
Notably, this dispute resolution process does
not say that FERC can override a conflicting state
recommendation when it finds that it is iiconsis-
tent with the Federal Power Act. After PUD No. 1. as
long as the state recommendation is consistent
with the CWA certification process to protect water
quality, it seems highly questionable that FERC
could override. Paragraph (a)(1) of section 401
states explicitly that "In o license or permit shall be
granted until the certification required by this sec-
tion has been obtained or has been waived.... No
license or permit shall be granted if certification has
been denied by the State....'41
Second, with respect to the economic infeasi-
bility test, it is notable that this position is in stark
contrast to the policy of the CWA, which excludes
considerations of economic or technical feasibility
in establishing water quality standards (although it
is pertinent to the issuance of individualized per-
mits to attain the standards).
42
The setting of water quality standards is the
foundation of a state's water quality control process
under the C-W.A. 43 Water quality standards are com-
prised of two elements: "designated uses" and
"water quality criteria."4 The EPA's numerous regu-
lations and guidelines to the states regarding the
adoption and implementation of water quality stan-
dards45 give the states a moderately free hand in
designating uses for a given water body. The state
may designate uses for a water body based upon a
uses. Such standards shall be such as to protect the
public health or welfare, enhance the quality of the
water and sere the purposes of this chapter. Such stan-
dards shall be established taking Into consideration
their use and value for public water supplies, propaga-
tion of fish and wildlife. recreational purposes, and agri-
cultural. Industrial. and other purposes, and also taking
into consideration their use and value for navigation.
33 USC § 1313(c)(2) (1994). Tritera are defined as -elements of
State water quality standards, expressed as constituent concentra-
tions. levels, or narrative statements, representing a quality of
water that supports particular use. When criteria are met. water
quality vll generally protect the designated use' 40 CF.R. §
131 3(b) (1994)
45 40 CFP,. 4 130-131 (1994-
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balancing of social and economic factors, provided
that "existing uses" are preserved. 46 Once uses are
designated for a particular water body, "states must
adopt those water quality criteria that protect the
designated use."47 "Criteria" are chemical, physical,
or biological characteristics of a water body,
48
which, when attained, protect the designated
uses.4 9 Water quality criteria must be established
on a defensible scientific basis 50 as contrasted to
considerations of economic or technological feasi-
bility."5' That the EPA is not to consider water sup-
ply impacts of its standard setting is reinforced by
the recent Fourth Circuit decision in James City and
County, VA. v. EPA.'
2
What about the other policy concern of the dis-
sent that PUD No. I would allow parochial state
interests in fishery protection to upset the broader
national interest in power generation?
First, it is not at all clear that fishery conserva-
tion subordinates broad public values to narrow
local concerns. Indeed, the opposite is indicated by
the usual alignment of parties in FERC proceedings,
where local power companies are usually arrayed
against national conservation organizations.
Second, as the majority point out, conflict
between state prescriptions and FERC fishery
release requirements is far from inevitable in view
of the 1986 amendment to the Federal Power Act
which now requires FERC to give fishery conserva-
tion "equal consideration" with power generation in
its licensing decisions .53 Logically, FERC should
oppose state minimum flow prescriptions only
when they are so onerous as to make the project
forevermore infeasible, not just more expensive,
and not just uneconomical at today's power rates.
Moreover, in California, there is little prospect
of the SWRCB exercising its water quality authority
in an unbalanced manner. The SWRCB's proceed-
ings to protect the Bay-Delta estuary have suffered,
since their inception seven years ago, from the
SWRCB's signalled intent to strike a balance
between the competing demands for Bay-Delta
waters among beneficial uses: environmental ver-
sus consumptive, and in-estuary versus export uses.
The implication is that the level of protection
attainable for the in-estuary beneficial uses, i.e., the
fisheries, is a function of the needs of the water
exporters. The problem with this approach is that It
fails to comport with the SWRCB's obligations
under the CWA to exclude consideration of eco-
nomics in setting water quality standards, as dis-
cussed above.
B. The Decision Suggests that the CWA Permits
States (and Perhaps the EPA) to Enforce
Measures to Protect use Designations Directly
and Independently of Water Quality Criteria.
Before PUD No. l, the conventional view was
that enforceable, individualized obligations to pre-
vent impairment of water quality were the product
of a sequence of administrative steps, proceeding
from planning to permitting. As discussed above,
first, the state goes through a planning process to
designate the "uses" of the water body that it wants
to protect. This includes both consumptive and
environmental uses. Second, the state adopts water
quality criteria or objectives. These are either
numerical or narrative prescriptions of the chemi-
cal, physical, or biological characteristics of the
water body which the state deems sufficient to pro-
tect the designated uses. Usually, they are stated as
constituent concentration limits. Then, the state
develops an implementation program which may
include: Best Management Practices for non-point
sources; a program to issue National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permits to limit indi-
vidual discharges into the water body; or, in the
case of use impairment due to flow alteration or
depletion, orders restricting or constraining the
exercise of water rights. It is only at the last stage
that water quality obligations are particularized and
become enforceable.
PUD No. 1 collapses this sequential process by
holding that the regulated project is required to
operate in a manner that is consistent with the des-
ignated use directly:
46.40 C.F.R. § 131.10(a), 131.10(h)(l) (1994).
47.40 C.F.R. § 131.11 (a) (1994). Significantly, the EPA deleted,
weaker language from an earlier regulation, which stated that crite-
ria had to be 'compatible with" protecting designated uses, on the
grounds that the 'compatible with" language was confusing and
misleading. 48 Fed. Reg. 51.402 (1983).
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(18) (1994).
49. 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b) (1994).
50. 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.10. 131.1 l(a)(l), 131.11(b) (1994).
51. 45 Fed. Reg. 79,319 (1980) (emphasis added). That eco-
nomic factors have no place in setting water quality criteria was
firmly established in Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resourres v. Costle,
625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1980). In this case, the court expressly reject-
ed the argument that a state has discretion to consider economic
and social factors in setting water quality criteria. Id. at 1276. The
court pointed out that Congress recognized the distinction between
designation of uses and setting of criteria "by placing with EPA the
duty to develop and publish water quality criteria reflecting the lat-
est scientific knowledge.' Id. Although consideration of economic
factors is relevant to the designation of uses, these factors were
irrelevant to the scientific and technical factors to be considered In
setting criteria to meet those uses.
52. 12 F.3d 1330. 1335-36 (4th Cir. 1993).
53. See Electric Consumers Protection Act, 16 U,S.C, §§ 797(e),
803(a)(1) (1994).
Volume 2, Number1Grolory A. %=mo
Fdl 1994 Th~ Rr~r~cufrrs of FUD lb. 1 fL'fkrscn Cetnty
IAI project that does not comply with the
designated use of the water does not com-
ply with the applicable water quality stan-
dards. Consequently, pursuant to § 401(d).
the State may require that a permit appli-
cant comply with both the designated uses
and the water quality criteria of the state
standards.
54
There are many interesting implications of this
interpretation of the CWA. It would seem to imply,
for instance, that, without amending the existing
water quality criteria, a state can impose more
demanding requirements where it determines that
the criteria are in fact insufficient to protect a desig-
nated use. Does this apply to all dischargers, or just
to applicants for a federal permit? And does it apply
only to states, or also to the EPA when it is acting in
lieu of a state in setting water quality standards?
Where the designated use is very broadly stated,
for instance, "estuarine habitat," the latitude this
interpretation gives to the regulatory agencies is
potentially breathtaking. The only effective limit of
this approach would seem to be that the requirement
must be designed to protect the designated use.
C. The Case Eliminates the Artificial Distinction
Between Regulation of Water Quality and
Regulation of Water Quantity as they Pertain to
Protection of Designated Uses of the Vater.
Historically, water quality and water quantity
regulation were viewed as running on separate
tracks. Water quantity administration is concerned
with allocating supply for consumptive uses, a func-
tion in which the state has enjoyed primacy. Water
quality regulation, by contrast, was conventionally
viewed as a matter of restricting the discharge of
contaminants into rivers or lakes at levels that
would adversely affect designated uses of the water-
course. The regulatory agencies that administer the
CWA have become adept at fashioning waste dis-
charge permits to assure that the requisite water
quality characteristics-parameters such as tem-
perature, oxygen, turbidity, and chemical concen-
trations-are attained. Thus administered, water
quality is maintained by controlling what goes into
a watercourse. Further, the legal mandates are dri-
ven primarily by federal law.
PUD No. I explicates the other dimension of
the water quality problem: the impairment of des-
ignated uses as a result of withdrawals of water
from the watercourse. One physical characteristic
of water that is vitally important to the well-being
of aquatic ecosystems is the physical availability of
the water itself, that is, of minimum streamflows.
The case makes clear that water quality planning is
also a function of what is taken out of a waterbody,
that diversions of water are subject to regulation
under the CVA.
The interrelationship between water quality
and water quantity has been debated and disputed
in no forum more contentiously than in the pro-
ceedings of the SWXRCB to adopt a water~quality
plan for the San Francisco Bay / Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta estuary. The Bay-Delta conflict raises
in sharp relief the extent to which federal laws that
govern state water quality planning permit the
states to calibrate water quality standards to eco-
nomic and social factors having to do with the con-
sumptive use of that water.
The SRCB escalated this debate in develop-
ing its 1991 water quality plan for the estuary when
it refused to consider freshwater inflows as a para-
meter controllable under its water quality adminis-
tration. The SWRCB issued a water quality control
plan that eliminated from consideration, ab initio,
the one water quality parameter most closely asso-
ciated with protection of estuarine resources, that
is. the physical availability of the water itself, the
form of freshwater inflows. The SVRCB premised its
decision to exclude consideration of freshwater
needs, inter alia. on the exhortation of the State
Court of Appeal in United States v. State Water Resources
Control Bd.55 In reviewing the SWRCB's previous
attempt to set water quality standards for the estu-
ary. the court held that the SVRCB had been
.unwise' in combining water quality regulation and
water rights administration in the same proceed-
ing."6 The S\VRCB reasoned that it did not have the
legal authority to reallocate water rights within a
water quality proceeding. This led the SWRCB to
adopt a water quality plan in 1991 that disregarded
the instream requirements of the fisheries and
other aquatic resources and that, in effect, subordi-
nated the environmental water demand to the
already established pattern of water exports from
the estuary.' 7 The resultant water quality plan was
54. 114 S. Ct. at 1910.
55. 182 Cal. App. 3d 82 (1986).
56. The SWRCB. however. misapprehended the courts point.
which was that combining the two phases tended to narrow imper-
missibly the universe of water users responsible for complying with
inflow requirements to meet water quality standards. The court
stated that the SWRCB unlawfully placed this burden only on the
water rights permit holders, whereas the responsibility actually
belonged to all water users.
57. The SWRCB has taken the position that. in setting water
quality standards for the Bay-Delta region, it Is permitted to bal-
ance the benefits of protecting the estuary's fish and wildlife
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so obviously deficient in its protection of fishery
and other environmental values that the EPA
declared it inadequate and proceeded to adopt fed-
eral replacement water quality standards which
should be finalized by December 15, 1994.
In PUD No. l, the Court explicitly recognized
that "a sufficient lowering of the water quantity in a
body of water could destroy all of its designated
uses." 8 Citing section 304 of the CWA, the Court
held that the type of "pollution" regulated by the
CWA is the man-made alteration of the chemical,
physical, biological, and radiological integrity of the
water body and that flow depletion is a type of phys-
ical alteration. 59 Thus, impairment of designated
uses may result from "'changes in the measure-
ment, flow, or circulation of any navigable
waters.. .including changes caused by the construc-
tion of dams."'6
This view of the CWA leads to intriguing ques-
tions of its application beyond the section 401 cer-
tification process. For instance, does the integra-
tion of water quantity regulation with water quality
regulation extend to EPA replacement standard set-
ting under section 303 of the CWA, such that the
EPA could regulate flows and diversions directly in
the Bay-Delta system instead of just regulating
salinity?
Whatever the doctrinal answer, this is unlikely
to happen. The CWA requires states to adopt imple-
mentation plans, 61 but does not authorize the EPA
to do so when the state defaults. Thus, the EPA can-
not directly regulate water use. This is a matter rel-
egated to the states. Note, however, that federal
facilities must comply with federal and state water
quality standards under the CWA. It is at least
arguable that, under this decision, the EPA could
directly regulate the operations of the Bureau of
Reclamation's Central Valley Project as it affects
attainment of the designated "estuarine habitat"
use of the Bay-Delta estuary.
D. Water Quality Regulation by Either the
State or Federal Governments May Restrict
Water Use, Notwithstanding the State Primacy
Over Water Allocations.
In abrogating the regulatory barrier between
water quality and water quantity regulation, PUD No.
I affects the states' administration of water rights
and the allocation of water. The decision rejected the
view that section 101(g) of the CWA prohibits the
water quality regulators from mandating that certain
minimum flows be left instream, at least when the
state is that regulator. It held that the minimum
stream flow prescription did not "determine lanyl
proprietary right to water;" rather, "it determines the
nature of the use to which that proprietary right may
be put under the ICWAI." 62 Thus, the Court limits the
application of section 101(g) to preserving the
authority of each state to allocate water quantity as
between users.63 This reservation of state prerogative
does not apparently extend to the question of the
allocation of water as between the rights holder and
the environment. The reservation protects state pri-
macy over priority of use, but not over total quanti-
ties available for diversion.
This approach seems consonant with both the
text of section 101(g) and its legislative history. This
section, adopted as part of the 1977 amendments to
the CWA, reads as follows:
It is the policy of Congress that the author-
ity of each State to allocate qualities of
water within its jurisdiction shall not be
superseded, abrogated or otherwise
impaired by this chapter. It is the further
policy of Congress that nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to supersede or
abrogate rights to quantities of water
which have been established by any State,
Federal agencies shall co-operate with
State and local agencies to develop com-
prehensive solutions to prevent, reduce
and eliminate pollution in concert with
programs for managing water resources.64
Section 101(g) was introduced by Senator
Wallop, who stated:
This amendment.. .seekls] to clarify the pol-
icy of Congress concerning the proper role
of Federal water quality legislation in rela-
tion to state water law. Legitimate water
quality measures authorized by this act may
at times have some effect on the method of
water usage. Water quality standards and
their upgrading are legitimate and neces-
resources against the economic and social costs of limiting diver-
sions of the freshwater inflow for irrigation and municipal water
supply. As noted above, this is Impermissible in that federal law
requires that the SWRCB only consider scientific data when deter-
mining what water quality standards are appropriate to protect des-
Ignated uses.
58. 114 S. Ct. at 1912-13.
59. Id. at 1913 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1994)).
60. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1994)).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994).
62. 114S. Ct.at 1913.
63. Id.
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1994).
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sary under this act. The requirements ... may
incidentally affect individual water rights....
It is not the purpose of this amendment to
prohibit those incidental effects.
... It is the purpose of this amendment to
insure that State allocation systems are
not subverted, and that effects on individ-
ual rights, if any, are prompted by legiti-
mate and necessary water quality consid-
erations.... It is designed to protect his-
toric rights from mischievous abrogation
by those who would use an act, designed
solely to protect water quality and wet-
lands, for other purposes. It does not inter-
fere 'with the legitimate purposes for which
the act was designed.6 '
The courts have not limited federal water quali-
ty requirements to those that can be achieved with-
out affecting water rights. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals grappled with this question
in Gorsuch, in the context of defining EPA and U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers authority to regulate dam
operation. The court recognized that section 101(g)
is a "specific indication ...that Congress did not
want to interfere any more than necessary with state
water management...."66 However, the court recog-
nized Senator Wallop's statement that section
101(g) was not intended to take precedence over
legitimate and necessary water quality considera-
tions" and allows the EPA to take measures neces-
sary to implement the CWA even when such actions
may have an incidental effect on water rights.67
Other cases reinforce this conclusion. The
Tenth Circuit, in Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrms, 13
concluded that section 101 (g), did not preclude EPA
denial of a nationwide permit that would admitted-
ly result in interference with the state's allocation
plan: "lal fair reading of the statute as a whole
makes clear that, where both the state's interest in
allocating water and the federal government's inter-
est in protecting the environment are implicated,
Congress intended an accommodation. " 69
It is dear in light of the legislative history and
cases that have addressed section 101(g), that the
section should not be interpreted to countenance a
lower level of protection of environmental resources
in cases where water rights must be altered to attain
it than in other cases. Section 101 (g) was included to
reassure states, in particular. California. that the
CWA could not be used as a tool to unnecessarily
Impair the state's authority to allocate water.
However, Congress understood full well that activi-
ties required to protect aquatic resources would
impact state authorized water rights. Such "inciden-
tal" effects are not prohibited under section 101(g) °
It is interesting to note, however, that justice
O'Connor's opinion in PUD No. I (that the minimum
stream flow requirement did not determine propri-
etary rights to water but merely determined the
nature of the use to which those rights could be put
under the CWA) 71 potentially allows states to go
beyond the "incidental effects" test when imple-
menting water quality standards to protect designat-
ed uses. Taken literally, the implication seems to be
that section 101(g) does not limit the authority of
state (or federal) regulators to reallocate water from
existing uses to the environment, so long as they
respect the state's administration of the relative and
correlative rights of those water users.
Operationally. water supply reductions resulting
from regulatory reallocations of water to the envi-
ronment would be treated within the state water
rights administration system just as any other reduc-
tion would, such as drought. In a sense, the decision
can be read as giving the environment a first priority
to the available water supply, leaving the remainder
to be allocated according to state principles. Stated
another way, section 101(g) reserves to the states
the decision on how to apportion the obligation
among water rights holders to relinquish water to
meet instream flows required by the CWA; but it
does not restrict the state (or federal) regulators
regarding the amount of flow or relinquishment that
is required to protect designated water quality uses.
Thus read, the extent of a state's ability to inter-
fere with vested water rights is potentially unlimit-
ed. A state could, for example, require a holder of a
consumptive water right to dedicate his or her
entire right to instream use, provided such dedica-
tion is for the purpose of protecting the stream's
designated uses under the CWA, and the amount of
the water right holder's allocation under state law is
not changed. This may seem inconsistent with the
proscription the Court recognizes in PUD No. 1
against changing proprietary rights to water in order
to implement water quality standards under the
CVA.7 There is a way to avoid this inconsistency,
however. The extent to which consumptive water
65.123 Cong. Rec 39. 212 (1977) (statement of Senator
Wallop).
66.693 F.2d at 178 (1982) (emphasis added).
67. l at 179 n.67.
68. 758 F.2d 508. 513 (10th Cir. 1985);
69. Lt. sa afm Ufrld S!afn v. Mn. 785 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1936).
70. I.
7!114 S Ct at 1913.
72Id.
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rights are actually affected by an instream flow
requirement depends upon the nature and extent of
those rights and how they are defined under state
law.73 As explained in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,74 if the "background principles" of state
property and nuisance law restrict the uses to which
property may be put, then there is no state law
property right to use one's property for these
restricted purposes to begin with.
In California, there are numerous well-estab-
lished common law doctrines and statutory provi-
sions that significantly limit the nature and extent
of property interests in water. These include the rea-
sonable and beneficial use doctrine,75 the public
trust doctrine,76 the doctrine of public ownership of
fish and water resources,77 and state nuisance law.78
These various laws and doctrines establish that
water rights in California have always been uncer-
tain and subject to substantial alteration and regu-
lation to meet changing public needs.79 Today,
these public needs include the need to protect the
public trust resources of the Bay-Delta estuary
through increased outflows. Thus, it can be argued
that implementation of instream flow requirements
to meet water quality standards in California does
not violate PUD No. l's or section 101(g)'s proscrip-
tion on significant alteration of water rights alloca-
tions, because, under California law, holders of con-
sumptive water rights have never had an unquali-
fied property interest.
III. Conclusion: Why Is PUD No. 1 Important to
Restoration of Aquatic Resources In California?
We know that minimum streamflow prescrip-
tions are insufficient at this time to protect, much
less restore, the public trust values of California's
watercourses. A 1992 report of the California Policy
73. Id.
74. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
75. See Cal. Const. art. X, § 2.
76. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60 (1971).
77. See People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 16 Cal. 397 (1897); Cal.
Water Code §§ 102, 104, 105 (West 1971).
78. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3479 (West 1994).
79. See generally Brian Gray, In Search of Bigfoot: The Common Law
Origins of Article X, § 2 of the California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST.
LAW. 0. 225 (1989); Tara Muellpr, Federal Regulation of Water Resources:
Does the Limited Nature of Property Interests In Water Prclude a Taking?, 3
Envn.. L. NEws (Cal. St. Bar Envtl. L. Sec.) No. 2 (1994).
80. MOYLE & YOSHIYMAN. FISHES, AouAIc DIvERSrIY MANAGEMENT
AREA, AND ENDANGERED SpEcIEs: A PLAN TO PROTECT CALIFORNIAS NATVE
AaUATic BIOTA (1992).
81. Human activity in and around San Francisco Bay and the
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Seminar of the University of California found that:
The problem of biodiversity loss is particu-
larly severe in freshwater habitats. Although
the loss of biodiversity in aquatic systems is
presumably occurring among all groups of
organisms, only fish are well enough studied
to provide a good idea of the actual trends.
California has 116 kinds of native fishes. Of
these, 8 are extinct, 15 are formally listed as
threatened or endangered, 28 qualify for list-
ing but are not yet listed, 21 are declining,
occur in small isolated populations or oth-
erwise need to be managed to keep from
becoming candidates for listing, and 44 do
not appear to be in any immediate danger.
In short, 62 percent of the native fishes are
in need of immediate special protection.
Extinctions of fish taxa are now occurring at
the rate of one every six years.... 80
Thus, sixty-two percent of the higher trophic
levels of aquatic species in California are either lost
or in need of immediate protection.
The causes of decline are various and complex.
In all cases, however, alteration and diminution of
natural stream flows are part of the causal dynamic.
Yet, even when the direct cause of declines is some
other chemical, physical, or biological agent,
depleted streamflows is almost always an exacer-
bating factor. The situation in the Bay-Delta estuary
is instructive. The extreme modifications of the
structure, hydraulics, and hydrology of the estuary
are the dominant reasons behind the decline of all
of the delta-dependent species,81 causing loss of
spawning habitat, nursery habitat, and the safety of
migratory pathways. 82 Massive diversions of water
from the southern delta to the Central Valley and
southern California and the consequent reductions
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta estuary has so disrupted the ecosys-
tem that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the U.S. Geological
Survey consider it to be the most modified of any major estuary In
the United States. R. Cross & D. Williams, Eds., Proceedings of the
National Symposium on Freshwater Inflow to Estuaries (FWS/OBS-81/04,
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Biological Services,
Washington, D.C., 1981) cited In Frederic H. Nichols et al., The
Modification of an Estuary, 231 SCIENCE 567 (1986).
82. The most significant changes began in the 1850's and are
continuing to this day. Early changes In the estuary were primarily
caused by diking and filling of more than 90% of wetland habitats,
sedimentation and other disruptions caused by hydraulic mining in
the Sierras, and the introduction of exotic species, The first observed
signs of the harm being done to the estuary were declining fisheries.
By the 1880's the Dungeness crab fishery moved offshore, Next to be
eliminated from the Bay were the commercial fisheries of large
predatory fishes such as salmon and sturgeon, Today only herring
and anchovies, small planktivorous species that move Into the estu-
ary from the ocean, are harvested commercially in the Bay.
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in Delta outflow to the Bay (by more than fifty per-
cent of historic levels in many months) continue to
cause major disruptions in this ecosystem. The
operation of water projects in a manner heedless of
the consequences to aquatic resources was epito-
mized in 1989; despite being in the third year of a
drought and in the face of plummeting fish popula-
tions, the Central Valley Project and State Water
Project were allowed to divert more water from the
Delta than in any other year in history.
How did we get to this pass? In a word, the old
water allocation rules have not proven workable for
meeting modem environmental demands. This is
the legacy of a century and a half of conversion of
public asset into private property.
California Water Code section 102 provides that
"lalll water within the State is the property of the
people of the State, but the right to the use of water
may be acquired by appropriation in the manner
provided by law."83 But, until recently,84 the "manner
provided by law" has been physical diversion or
control of the water, not instream use.85 As a result,
water resources have been largely acquired before
the public, to whom they belong, gets a share.
By freeing minimum streamflow prescriptions
from the shackles of FERC pre-emption and water
right protection, the Supreme Court in PUD No. I has
created new opportunities to address the systemic
asymmetry in the allocation of a public resource for
the ultimate public purpose: protecting aquatic
diversity for the benefit of future generations.
83. Cal. Water Code § 102 (West 1971).
84. In recognition of these distressing facts, the California
Legislature last term enacted a provision, codified as § 1707 of the
Water Code. to authorize the SWRCB to approve petitions by exist-
ing water rights holders to transfer their water to Instream and
other environmental uses if other legal users and the public Inter-
est are protected. By permitting water to be transferred on a volun-
tary basis only from an existing user to the environment, this sec-
tion of the Water Code provides an attractive alternative to the
involuntary reallocation of water that will otherwise be necessary to
protect aquatic resources under existing state and federal laws. Cal.
Water Code § 1707 (West Supp. 1993)
85. This was made clear in two california Court of Appeal deci-
sions in 1979: Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd, 90 cal. App.
3d 590 (1979), held that the california Department of Fish and Game
had no authority to appropriate water to protect fisheries; Coalnords
Trout. Inc. v. State Water Resources control Ed., 90 Cal. App 3d 816 (1979),
holding private parties may not appropriate water for instream uses.

